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Is it still worth to study the public sector with organizational lenses? The real 
world keeps struggling with issues and demands that require the intervention of 
some sort of public action no market mechanism or charity initiative would be     2 
able to achieve. And yet knowledge production about public set ups seems to 
have become rather poor these very last years. 
 
Mainstream  organization  theories  are  not  inspired  or  driven  by  public 
organization research as much as they are by other objects such as firms or 
economic regimes such as markets. Publications and colloquia suggest that most 
of the time public agencies are used as cases or empirical material for other 
purposes than the understanding of public organizations as such. They provide 
evidence to explore some broader facets of general organization theory. They 
may also feed knowledge and approaches covering rather specialized areas or 
narrow  defined  domains  such  as  those  dealing  with  health,  police  or  social 
welfare.  
 
The picture looks grim when public organizations are considered as a specific 
inquiry  domain.  To  what  extent  are  they  organizational  constructs  and 
configurations  of  a  special  kind,  that  are  different  from  other  types  of 
organizations, or not?  Not much attention is allocated to public organizations as 
public. 
 
While  in  the  1970s  about  half  of  the  papers  submitted  to  international 
conferences  and  colloquia  specialized  in  organization  studies  such  as  EGOS 
specifically dealt with public sector organizations, they attracted only around 
five percent thirty years later. Pockets of sociological analysis still exist, but in 
specific areas and policy-centered domains such as police, health, military or 
education.  
 
Academic labor markets have experienced a revolution. It may be estimated that 
in  some  European  countries,  and  within  about  twenty  years,  the  number  of 
organizations study doctoral dissertations dealing with firms has increased by a 
factor of seven to eight. During the same period the number of theses covering 
public organizations at large has decreased. In a country like France, the number 
of  doctoral  students  working  on  public  management  and  policymaking  has 
declined by more than half.  
 
The  reasons  mentioned  to  explain  such  a  lack  of  academic  enthusiasm  and 
creativity may be several.  
 
One comment is often heard. Value added return would be stagnating when not 
declining about knowledge on public organizations.  Their study would tend to 
replay again and again old tunes such as the bureaucratic paradigm. They also 
are  blamed  for  supposedly  delivering  quite  marginal  discoveries.  They  even 
rediscover the wheel.  
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So-called paradigm life cycles and fads should also be blamed for. To make 
contributions to supposedly dominant or fashionable schools of thought such as 
network theory, agency theory or critical studies would make access to academic 
careers and publishing opportunities much easier than to specialize in public 
organizations.  
 
Professional education institutions such as business schools have offered more 
and better job opportunities than sociology and political sciences departments. 
This has coincided with a time when humanities were facing a lasting identity 
crisis (Horowitz 1993) and a declining labor.  With the exception of New Public 
Management  related  issues,  research  funding  has  also  massively  dropped  in 
many countries, at least when compared with other topics. 
 
Another  line  of  argumentation  refers  to  the  degree  of  ignorance  junior 
researchers as well as some of their teachers manifest about fundamentals in 
social  sciences.  Scientific  lessons  and  work  published  before  the  1980s  are 
simply ignored, hindering cumulative progress and making debates or research 
agendas  quite  repetitive. Business  school  doctoral  students  and  faculty  often 
have  quite  weak  or  biased  undergraduate  exposure  to  the  fundamentals  of 
disciplines like sociology and political science. Either they have an engineering 
or law educational background or, when they had a major in economics, for 
instance, organization as a topic was restricted to an object to be studied by 
axiomatic approaches only.  
 
The purpose of the paper is to argue that publicness still makes sense as an issue 
for further research investment; 
 
Its first section shall question whether organizational knowledge provided by 
empirically  grounded  social  sciences  has  really  explored  publicness  in  an 
exhaustive manner. It shall be argued that classic organizational sociology  – 
defined by a standard theory or definition of its domain (Thoenig 1998) - has 
provided a breakthrough in many respects, as a Verstehen perspective, as a body 
of conceptual and methodological frameworks. At the same time it did not fully 
explore and address the agenda about public organizations as such.   
 
How should publicness be handled as an issue?  The perspective suggested in 
the  second  section  assumes  that  public  organizations  are  organizations  of  a 
specific nature. Compared with firms, churches or voluntary associations, they 
should be considered as different, not on a ordinal scale but in cardinal terms, at 
least on one key dimension. They are in charge of public policy effectiveness, of 
a production function that generates societal impacts. Such a research agenda, 
that finds inspiration in policy studies and suggests a theory of governmental 
agencies of its own, should eventually be empirically tested in a more systematic     4 
way.  A  general  idea  underlying  it  is  that,  while  large  similarities  may  exist 
between public and non-public entities on some aspects of their organizational 
models, the function they are accountable for is quite specific from an action as 
well as from an order standpoint. 
 
The third section shall present a few reasons and examples why policies, their 
making and their management, still offer a fruitful access to further empirical 
inquiry  on  public  organizations.  Knowledge  gaps  remain  that  should  be  of 
interest  for  political  scientists,  public  administration  and  other  related  social 
science disciplines. 
 
1. A still open agenda 
 
Public  sector  organizations  are  human  enterprises  and  social  configurations 
committed to the provision of goods and services that are of public essence. 
They also are part of government at one level or another. The question may be 
raised  whether  public  sector  organizations  define  indeed  a  domain  for 
organizational  enquiry.  In  which  ways  are  they  unique  and  specific?  Does 
publicness matter? 
 
Publicness  as  defined  by  the  formal  status  of  the  organization  remains  a 
questionable criterion. A variety of legal statuses and territorial areas handle 
public affairs in modern societies. Governments at various levels, from urban 
communes to the United Nations, rely on complex and highly differentiated sets 
of  formal  organizations  they  control  (Thoenig  1997,  figure  1,  p.  42,).  The 
separation  line  between  public  and  private  does  not  appear  easy  to  draw 
descriptively.  
 
The reference to law provides no solid ground for another reason.  Civil service 
in the Common Law tradition as well as public administration in the Roman 
Law perspective do not control in a monopolistic way the handling of public 
affairs, from law and order, fire protection and environmental protection policies 
to education, land use and social welfare. Hybrid institutional designs and fuzzy 
legal statuses are common practice. Some public agencies operate openly in a 
market related manner. They face competition from private firms. The state acts 
as  a  profit-oriented  owner.  In  several  sectors  governmental  authorities 
consistently subcontract collective good mandates and allocate public funds to 
not for profit associations, the latter getting most of their budget from taxpayer 
money, not from charities or clients-users. Some non-governmental entities such 
as firms, associations or citizens play an important role in delivering collective 
goods, quite often without being formally mandated to do so. The state may be 
one decisive actor. Nevertheless it is far from having exclusive ownership and     5 
control of public affairs, from the definition of the issues to be addressed to the 
design of actual solutions and their implementation. 
 
When public sector organizations are treated as a special class or type, scholars 
quite often assume that their legal status, the fact that they report to some state 
or  governmental  authority,  provides  a  sufficient  criterion  to  postulate  their 
uniqueness, without considering in depth the question of the specificity of such a 
status and its empirical manifestations. In a way they commit the same sin than 
old institutionalism. They ignore the massive knowledge contribution made by 
sociology of organizations. 
 
Within  half  a  century  the  scientific  status  of  public  sector  in  organizations 
studies  has  evolved  in  major  ways.  The  1960s  settled  a  major  debate.  Old 
institutionalism  inspired  by  formal-legal  approaches  such  as  public 
administration theory in North America and science administrative in Europe 
started  to  decline.  Sociologists  and  political  scientists  relying  on  empirical 
observation  and  behavioral  approaches  took  control.  They  suggested  that 
publicness was not to be considered as a given or an axiom but as a problem for 
enquiry. They took the lead in generating knowledge. 
 
Sociology of organizations also challenged Marxist inspired perspectives. Meso 
level phenomena such as organizations should not any longer be considered as 
mere  superstructures.  Class  struggles  and  vested  interest  dynamics  do  not 
explain the whole story about how ministries and public agencies operate.  
 
The paradox is that the end of the 20
th century coincides with a spectacular 
change in the agenda, as if publicness as an issue had lost attraction. A broader 
picture suggests that sociology of organizations has indeed lost momentum. It 
has even been marginalized by other disciplines or paradigms.  
 
An illustration is given by public management education. Public management as 
a specific domain had developed in the USA and in Europe in the early 1970s. It 
kept organizational issues at the top of priorities to be researched and managed. 
Leading figures like Aaron Wildavsky (1979), a political scientist by training, 
considered contributions made by sociologists such as Martin Landau (1969) as 
major  sources  for  their  own  inspiration.  Unfortunately,  in  the  late  1980s, 
political and organizational Verstehen of public phenomena lost some ground. 
Competing  disciplines  came  to  the  forefront  that  gave  more  visibility  to 
normative perspectives. Policy analysis and policy design inspired by axiomatic 
approaches  that  blend  microeconomics,  agency  theory  and  quantitative-only 
types  of  data  took  over.  In  some  cases  they  forgot  analysis  underway  and 
preached managerial recipes linked to ideologies such as rational choice.  
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Therefore one argument would be that sociology of  public organizations has 
faced strong opposition. The field and the domain of publicness have been taken 
over by two alternative paradigms: perspectives inspired by market and firm 
references, new versions of old critical or even anti-positivist postures. While 
ideologically New Public Management and Postmodernism do not share much 
in  common,  both  tend  to  question  when  not  deny  the  specificity  of  public 
organizations as social constructs. The former argues that market principles and 
private firm type of management have to be used as benchmarks. The latter 
considers that the public sector is just one facet of a much broader trend or 
characteristic  that  is  at  work  across  societies  such  as  undesirable  organized 
principles  and  organizing  processes  oppressing  contemporary  mankind  and 
enabling  capitalism  and  globalization  to  rule  the  world.  In  some  extreme 
versions,  critical  theories  even  argue  that  organizations  are  phenomena  or 
artifacts that are illusions, not topics for knowledge. 
 
Defined by Max Weber (1922) as a major step toward modernity and rationality 
in act, bureaucracy gradually became a scapegoat and a problem to fight. It is 
ironic  to  see  that, more  than  sociologists, economists  such  as  Edith  Penrose 
(1959), Kenneth Arrow (1974) or Oliver Williamson (1975), to name a few, 
were pioneering in characterizing the properties of firms as a distinctive type of 
organization.  Such  contributions,  the  ways  of  reasoning  and  the  pro-market 
flavor they promote, have influenced quite strongly public organization studies 
for the last part of the twentieth century. Rational Choice and Public Choice 
approaches define new frontiers about public sector enterprises. Efficiency is 
substituting legalism as source of legitimacy. Management, not administration, 
provides the reference for political regimes applied to the public sector. New 
Public Management, legitimated by international institutions such as the World 
Bank and the OECD, inspired many if not most public funding allocated to 
programs on administrative reform in the public sector.  
 
Another version of the story would underline the ambiguous way sociologists of 
organizations themselves had dealt with publicness related matters. In fact all 
the  promises  have  not  been  or  could  not  be  delivered.  Various  endogenous 
reasons  may  explain  the  relative  decline  of  classic  organizational  sociology 
applied to governmental agencies.  
 
A first reason is linked to the term of bureaucracy.  
 
The founding father himself did not help when he published in the late 1920s his 
theory  of  bureaucracy  as  a  formal  organization.  On  one  side  it  inspired  an 
ambitious  and  fruitful  research  program  that  started  in  the  early  1950s  with 
contributions from pioneering figures such Robert Merton (1952), Robert Dahl     7 
and Charles Lindblom (1953) and Peter Blau (1955). It lasted at least for twenty 
years.  
 
On the other side it opened the door to an ambiguous positioning of the term of 
bureaucracy by organizational sociologists. Three meanings overlapped and still 
do:  a  descriptive  and  conceptual  one  that  could  apply  to  any  organization, 
whatever its legal status would be, a way to call any agency controlled by the 
state,  and  a  pejorative  meaning  linked  to  big  government,  red  tape  and 
frustrations of users. Despite attempts to avoid confusion made by authors like 
Victor  Thompson  (1961)  -  his  distinction  between  bureaucracy  as  a  formal 
model  of  organization,  bureaupathology  as  exaggerated  qualities  such  as 
resistance to change or ritualistic routines, and bureausis, a neologism defining 
the negative impacts induced among its clients by bureaucratization -, despite 
sharper and sharper analytical and conceptual frameworks defining the model 
and  its  latent  functions  by  Robert  Merton  (1940)  or  Michel  Crozier  (1963), 
sociology of organizations was to some extent trapped by the polysemic status 
of a key term it was currently using.  
 
The motivations that were driving the personal agenda of some scholars were 
close to the disappointment and the worries that had inspired Roberto Michels 
(1949) about the becoming of socialist parties and trade unions in European 
democracies  in  the  early  part  of  the  1900s.  Trotzkyist  activism  during  their 
youth influenced political critiques of New Deal institutions by Philip Selznick 
(1949) or motivated Martin Lipset and his colleagues (1956) to understand why 
it was possible to avoid the iron law of oligarchy and to maintain a high level of 
democratic life to develop within a American trade union. From U.S. southern 
states  libertarian  to  Eastern  liberal  backgrounds,  the  spectrum  of  sources  of 
inspiration and social debate leading to organizational studies was quite wide. 
The  economic  crisis  of  the  early  1930s followed by  the  management  of the 
Second  World  War  efforts  and  consequences  had  boosted  the  growth  of 
government. Various models of Welfare State were starting to develop on both 
sides of the Atlantic Sea.  
 
To some extent sociology of organizations studying governmental organizations, 
but  also  political  parties  and  even  firms,  became  perceived  as  focused  too 
narrowly  on  field  studies  and  model  buildings  that  were  bureaucratic  and 
therefore  pathological.  Alternative  solutions  or  better  types  were  not 
spontaneously  associated  with  its  knowledge.  This  opened  the  way  to  other 
approaches or disciplines, considered as more in line with modernity. 
 
A second reason is linked to postulates that have not been verified accurately. 
Such is typically the case with the existence of the differences, if any, between 
organization in the public sector and organization in other sectors.      8 
 
A  striking  aspect  of  the  program  standard  sociology  of  organizations  has 
achieved is the relative incomplete or ambiguous answers it has provided to the 
problem. The specificity of each, if any, has been addressed in a rather shy way. 
One test is to go through handbooks and encyclopedia that have been published 
since the late 1950s (March and Simon 1958; March 1965). In quite many of 
them  no  chapter  is  specifically  devoted  to  the  issue.  This  reflects  a  broader 
phenomenon. 
 
A  widely  shared  opinion  by  organizational  sociologists  was  that  differences 
existed. Private firms are assumed to be less rigid and more able to listen to their 
environment. The reason is that they have to survive in competitive markets, 
while public agencies face less changing and unpredictable environments. Public 
agencies are postulated to be more efficient than private firms when economic 
and political development is required. Fred Riggs (1969), for instance, argued 
that developing countries need public sector to come to prominence because of a 
polity “unbalanced” between their strong political system and their weak public 
administration sphere.  
 
Nevertheless  comparisons  have  rather  failed.  They  are  not  always  based  on 
technically solid ground. While some examples are quite disturbing, evidence 
shows in a consistent way that, for instance, the existence of a specific and 
strong form  of  administrative sector  does  not  explain, all other things being 
equal, why development is or is not generated. Field surveys suggest ordinal 
differences  on  various  parameters  such  as  formal  properties  or  modes  of 
functioning of organizations according to the fact that they are profit oriented, 
not for profit or governmental. The problem is that quite many studies suggest 
that bureaucratization measured by the levels of formalization, centralization of 
authority and complexity in the division of tasks is in many cases quite strong in 
leading business firms and, comparatively, quite low in public agencies. State 
bureaucracies  are  not  by  nature  prone  to  rigidities  in  the  way  they  actually 
function, other types of organizations being less stalled as a matter of principle. 
Evidence as it can be synthesized does not go very far.  
 
One point is striking about the interface between sociology of organizations and 
publicness. Knowledge produced by the discipline owes a lot to the study of 
public sector agencies. But publicness has not been its key concern as a social 
phenomenon.   
 
In Europe and even more in the U.S.A., pioneering contributions by sociologists 
have  studied  public  agencies  as  empirical  tests  for  the  validity  of  basic 
paradigms.  Herbert  Simon  (1947)  observes  how  city  park  managers  decide 
about  new  projects.  The  doctrine  of  absolute  rationality  is  fallacious  when     9 
considering  human  behaviors  in  organized  settings.  Philip  Selznick  (1949) 
shows how the Tennessee Valley Authority that had been founded by President 
Franklin Roosevelt is exposed to secondary institutionalization processes at the 
level of its grass roots units.  
 
This  tradition  has  made  immense  contributions  to  knowledge  about 
organizations in general and firms in particular. Agencies operating in the public 
sector  have provided  breakthrough discoveries. Concepts such  as  cooptation, 
power and control, theories such as culturalism, functionalism and redundancy 
and overlap, have received wide attention from a second generation of scholars. 
Peter  Blau  (1955)  studies  two  public  welfare  agencies  and  discovers  a  law:  
employment security and autonomy are conducive to a positive attitude toward 
change.  Michel  Crozier  (1963)  derives  his  explanation  of  the  way  national 
cultural norms embedded organizations from monographs on the French postal 
agency  and  the  state  owned  manufacture  of  cigarettes.  James  March  and 
Michael  Cohen  (1974)  develop  the  garbage  can  model  primarily  from 
observations  about  how  American  universities  are  governed.  The  list  seems 
endless of many of the prominent figures in the discipline from Amitai Etzioni 
(1961) and his discovery of the phenomenon of compliance to Charles Perrow 
and his social-structural approach (1970). 
 
Most of the time, public organizations were treated as illustrations of a more 
general  type  of  social  configuration  called  organizations.  Any  organization, 
including the firm, is embedded by power dynamics and functions as a political 
arena made of strategic behaviors (March 1962). Neo-institutionalism (March 
and Olsen 1984) provides a convincing example. Today perspectives bringing 
the institutional phenomena back in are widely diffused in business schools and 
endorsed by many scholars when dealing with market and firm contexts. But 
several of the pioneers of what is sometimes labeled as American sociological 
institutionalism  (Thoenig  2003)  study  phenomena  like  the  diffusion  of  new 
patterns of organizational management across cities (Tolbert and Zucker 1983), 
sets of art museums (DiMaggio 1991) or elementary schools (Scott and Meyer 
1994). Conformity and legitimacy imperatives explain why similar institutional 
forms diffuse across organizational fields. How far the public status makes or 
does not make a difference with firms or with not for profit statuses still remains 
an open research question (Thoenig 2004). 
 
2. Publicness as a research problem  
 
Analytically sharper approaches of publicness may be required. More than the 
legal status, it is the actual relationship to political governance and governmental 
authority that may matter.  
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Despite vanishing differences and the rise of a swollen middle (Hennart 1993), 
organizations that are public, whether they are profit or not for profit oriented, 
may be characterized by their exposure to the political arena. Some private firms 
such  as  those  operating  in  public  utilities,  are  more  public  than  some  state 
owned companies that in principle are public service agencies but in fact do 
operate  as  market  driven  organizations,  such  as  some  railroad  or  energy 
producers in the European Union. Barry Bozeman (1987) defines publicness as 
the fact that government more than market factors influences action-taking and 
contexts in which organizations operate, whatever their legal status is. Exposure 
to the political arena matters more or less according to circumstances. While 
such  a  criterion  makes  good  sense,  it  nevertheless  does  not  really  help 
organizations studies to generate thick analysis.  
 
An alternative approach of publicness assumes that public organizations are a 
specific  type  of  social  configuration  driven  by  and  accountable  for  two 
production  functions,  and  not  just  for  one,  as  it  is  the  case  for  firms  and 
voluntary associations: 
  operational  outputs.  This  function  relates  to  inner  efficiency,  to  the 
production of specific goods and services that can be easily identified and 
numbered; 
  societal change outcomes. This production function handles the delivery 
of  effectiveness.  It  deals  with  rather  mid-term,  indirect  and  less 
quantifiable effects. 
 







Production function 1 
Internal administration 
Efficiency, Productivity, cost, 
quality, reliability  
 
Production function 2 
External policy management 
Effectiveness 
Adequacy, content,  
public issue solving     11 
 
 
Such  a  perspective  takes  into  consideration  action  as  well  as  legitimacy 
attributes.  It  owes  a  lot  to  a  normative  and  public  management  orientation. 
Nevertheless for analytic purposes it provides a rather new and fruitful grid to 
explore into depth.  
 
Administration in general refers to the way resources or inputs such as money, 
personnel and raw components are linked to visible outputs or finished products 
such  as  the  number  of  cars  manufactured  or the volume  of  oil  refined. The 
purpose is either to minimize the resources used to achieve a certain amount of 
production or to maximize production for a given amount of resources allocated. 
Economists describe such a coupling as an internal production function. The 
goal to achieve by the hierarchy is efficiency. The tools available are techniques 
and procedures such as accounting, cost control, human relations, logistics, etc. 
The time horizon is conventionally defined and not a matter for debate. Budget 
cycles  are  annually  grounded,  productivity  inside  a  plant  is  measured  by 
conventional standards, etc. 
 
The  nature  of  efficiency  remains  a  research  question.  Productivity,  client 
satisfaction, costs are criteria among many others to consider. It also has been 
argued, quite wisely and well ahead of New Public Management, that efficiency 
as  a  normative  reference  remains  too  often  success-oriented  (Landau  and 
Chisholm 1995). Other doctrines of efficiency are at work in public management 
such as failure avoidance. In this case reliability, and not optimality, provides 
their foundation. Organizational redundancies and overlaps of jurisdictions may 
downgrade microeconomic performance proxies and increase the annual cost 
structure. But whenever a major accident, catastrophe or unrest happens that is 
not recurrent and remains unpredictable, whether meteorological, technical or 
social, the system supplies enough slack and reliable sources of know-how to 
minimize the consequences. 
 
Except for some minor legal differences (status of the employees, appropriation 
and accounting rules), public agencies face similar administrative contexts than 
those private firms acting on the market are dealing with. Inner management 
looks alike in both worlds. But, and this makes  the whole difference, public 
sector organization administration has a second production function to take into 
account,  that  private  organizations  have  not.  This  function  is  called 
effectiveness. It is not internal to the institution but external. It is embedded in a 
societal fabric of some sort. Therefore it is more complex to administer a public 
organization than a private one.  
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Effectiveness refers to the way specific outputs or finished products, goods and 
services, are causally linked to policy outcomes and societal impacts they are 
supposed to generate. These outcomes and impacts are of a special nature as 
compared with outputs and products. No consensual timeframe states when to 
make  such  assessments,  how  and  with  which  indicators.    The  public 
organization has no monopoly to define them  a priori. More or less volatile 
groupings express non convergent opinions about them, select those that make 
sense  for  them,  judge, evaluate  more  or  less  spontaneously  whether specific 
societal impacts are a success or a failure, and whether they may be attributed to 
a specific policy endorsed by a specific public institution. 
 
Education  offers  a  good  illustration.  Whether  public  or  private,  schools  as 
organizations  burn  resources  and  deliver  services  that  can  be  measured  in 
exactly the same terms: how much does it cost to teach reading to a young kid, 
what is the level of reading to achieve after one year, etc. There is no basic 
reason why by definition efficiency should systematically be different between 
both sectors. But a private school is free to define by itself (its head, its board of 
owners, etc) its own raison d’￪tre, the ends its outputs and its functioning have 
to  serve:  making  money,  building  a  dominant  market  share,  acquiring 
reputation, etc. As long as it complies with constraints such as public regulations 
and the contract signed with the principal, it can change its location, reform its 
pedagogy, increase its fees, etc. If it considers these constraints to be too tight 
for the ultimate goal it had decided by its own to serve, it may exit the domain, 
stop delivering certain goods, close its doors or offer a different program to 
different clients, become a training school for secretaries or for hairdressers. 
Most if not all public schools cannot. They are not masters of their own fate. 
Neither are they mere functional suppliers. Their geographical location matters 
as much when not more than their cost structure and their productivity. They 
may be settled on purpose in specific areas to serve specific populations. They 
not only educate kids how to read, they also socialize them and their parents to a 
certain  style  of  community  life  and  values.  The  presence  of  a  school  offers 
upward mobility opportunities to social milieus that are deprived of them. In 
other terms, public schooling endorses a broader societal mission that comes on 
top of its narrow functional efficiency function. 
 
To assess the level of publicness, it is less important to consider whether on not 
an organization is owned or controlled formally by the state and it becomes 
more relevant to check whether it has discretion to define its own criteria of 
success and its ultimate goals. Inside the same country publicly owned agencies 
may differ quite much. Some function as if they would be private firms, setting 
their own goals and criteria of efficiency, without being accountable for any 
effectiveness  function.  Others  are  accountable  de  facto  for  both  production 
functions.  They  are  supposed  to  be  somehow  efficient  while  being  also     13 
effective. How organizationally the balance between both production functions 
is achieved, and with which consequences, are questions still to open to further 
research.  
 
As a concept publicness is characterized by four main properties: 
  ownership of societal impacts 
  policy mandates legitimized by governmental authority 
  multiple and divergent indicators of success and failure 
  no spontaneous self-evaluation. 
 
A public organization manages a policy which ultimate goals are defined and 
assessed  by  third  parties,  some  governmental  authority  when  not  a  set  of 
differentiated stakeholders, public and private.  
 
Public organizations are submitted to policies which goals they do not legitimize 
by themselves. Third parties do, usually the political authorities that govern the 
domain. They pour money into such and such domain, appoint people, fund the 
acquisition of equipment, etc. Two classes of outcomes are expected to generate.  
Negatives are to eliminated or have not to happen that otherwise would disrupt 
society – crime, poverty, fire protection, water and air pollution, etc. Positives 
should be supplied, outcomes should be provided to induce improvements or to 
satisfy aspirations that otherwise, if nothing would be done by the government 
and the state, would not be supplied by civil society spontaneously – cultural 
development  and  access  to  arts,  local  economic  development,  access  to  job 
markets, etc.  A public policy is not just the policy of a public organization. 
Polities shape and governmental policies legitimize a set of collective norms and 
actions  about  societal  change  to  which  public  enterprises  are  expected  to 
conform.  Exogenous  reasons  and  achievements  frame  effectiveness.  They 
provide the essence of a public enterprise. 
 
Evidence shows that political authorities play a  more or less  important role. 
They  may  not  always  seem  to  be  proactive,  but  their  non-acts  are  acts  that 
matter  and  have  consequences. Impacts  to  achieve  are  most of  the  time  not 
defined in details and a priori. Political rationality or electoral cycles may lead 
governmental  authorities  to  avoid  commitments  about  long  term  and 
quantitative  goals.  .  Political  executive  and  legislative  bodies  care  more  for 
symbolic impacts and immediate support from public opinion and less for actual 
consequences in the long run. Agencies may even be left by their own so that 
they  substitute  in  a  technocratic  manner  their  own  know  how,  routines  and 
definition of the goals to reach. In certain circumstances more cynical motives 
may be at work. Governmental authorities pass new laws and make new policy 
announcements while being aware of the difficulty to get them enforced on the 
field.  Such  is  the  case  for  symbolic  policies.  Their  real  stake  is  to  produce     14 
support from public opinion, and not lasting impacts on daily practices. Their 
latent message sounds like  “do not worry, we care about”. But, at the end, 
accountability and initiative remain attributes of the political arena.    
 
Public organizations play a societal role that goes far beyond their technical 
function  of  providing  goods  and  services.  They  shape  society,  polity  and 
ecology, they construct and influence purposively their environments. 
 
A public agency may have to maintain certain categories of roads in a specific 
geographic area. To do so it can deliver itself all the outputs that are part of its 
mandate. It may also subcontract their production to private suppliers. In any 
case the raison d’￪tre of its internal production function or efficiency is not to 
expand its road maintenance market share or to deliver a profit that maximizes 
the satisfaction of its owners or principals. What really matters at the end is that 
traffic safety does not downgrade, that transportation fluidity increases, that the 
politicians  who  head  the  public  jurisdiction  do  not  get  blamed  by  local 
constituencies.   
 
In  any  cases  such  societal  impacts  are  not  obvious  to  define.  Public 
organizations face a world in which ambiguity is the name of the game. How far 
the impacts or outcome are direct consequences of causes such as the outputs 
delivered  by  the  agency  remains  not  always  easy  to  assess.  On  top  of  that, 
political rationality, which implies the possibility open to political policy makers 
not to be held responsible for their past decisions whatever their actual impacts 
have been, makes the environment of public organizations quite volatile and 
uncertain Embedding public agencies socially and politically is a way to induce 
effectiveness. To a certain extent backward mapping and re-interpretation of 
rules  are  quite  common  practice  at  the  level  of  so-called  street  bureaucrats 
(Elmore 1982). 
 
Publicness implies that agencies are confronted with two kinds of knowledge 
sources. One is related to the structure of its formal organization. The other one 
is carried by the policies they are in charge of.  
 
Organizations  in  general  are  social  constructs  aimed  at  achieving  some 
collective reliability out of risky actors such as individuals and small groups. 
How to make different logics of actions compatible to produce a certain type of 
goods and services is perhaps the most fundamental question academic research 
addresses  since  many  years.  Key  properties  of  an  organization  such  as 
centralization of authority, asymmetric and linear relationships, specialization of 
tasks and jurisdictions, procedural as well as substantive decision rules design a 
structure of knowledge, a theory (Thoenig 1998). They anticipate consequences 
to  be  generated.  They  prescribe  what  will  happen  when  specific  acts  are     15 
produced, when such and such governmental interventions are made in a stated 
area and in certain manner. Knowledge is perfect when no fault occur, when the 
formal solutions for the operations to conduct are always correct. Organizations 
supply certainty and reliability.    
 
Policies also are theories, but of a different nature. Any policy  blends some 
normative with some factual premises. Death penalty is a judicial policy. Its 
raison d’￪tre can be formulated according to two quite different premises. One 
is moral or ideological. The penalty may be legitimized as a form of societal 
duty, of ethical revenge. Those who have killed have to pay for their crime with 
their own death. Such values are set or shared a priori. They are not testable and 
open  to  verification.  Another  set  of  premises  legitimizing  death  penalty  are 
factual. Such is the case with deterrence. Future events are expected to differ 
from past ones.  Potential killers shall be afraid to commit a crime of the same 
class. Consequences can be traced, tested empirically and evaluated later on.  
 
Factual premises are hypotheses (Landau 1977).  A policy proposes a set of acts 
and non-acts to alter some existing context or mode of conduct. It is intentional, 
as it expresses the will of a policy maker. It is designed to attain in the future 
some  goals  or  outcomes  by  producing  today  some  outputs.    Policies  are 
therefore  describing  or  postulating  in  a  more  or  less  implicit  manner  three 
components; a desired state condition, a supposed present condition, a set of 
means to change the present condition in the future. They assert if-then linkages. 
Policies are supposed to control and direct future courses of action in a world 
that is uncertain and risky. The function of their empirical claims is to eliminate 
errors.  
 
Facts suggest that  errors  are  common  and that dysfunctional  phenomena  are 
widely present. Two major sources exist.  
 
A first one is linked to errors of the theory on which the policy is relying. The 
latter may be built on wrong effectiveness assumptions about social, economic 
and  ecological  phenomena.  Wrong  assumptions  are  made  about  the  factual 
situation  today  and  the  probability  to  generate  the  future  desired  state.  For 
instance death penalty does not deter killers. Policy makers ignore reality on 
which they intervene and have wrong representations of the conducts to change 
and the dynamics to mobilize for that purpose. More accurate use of scientific 
knowledge dealing with the specific policy domain – for instance criminology - 
may provide tools for better effectiveness.  
 
A second one derives from dysfunctions in efficiency. Inner management may 
be poor, formal structures may not be adequate. Implementation is a key point. 
Governmental authorities rely massively on organizations to implement them.     16 
Evidence consistently shows that this transfer is not easy to achieve in a smooth 
manner. It remains a source of risk and waste. Policy studies even suggest that 
up to two thirds of the failures originate because of what happens during the 
implementation  or  administration  phase.  Implementation,  being  achieved  by 
organizations, is prone to routine and to biases. The formal organization as a 
source of error geometrically increases the number and intensity of errors. For 
instance discretionary behaviors of street level enforcers, when not repressed by 
their supervisors, may lead to failing policies. A law exists but it is not fully 
enforced.  It  is  a  consequence  of  a  policy  error  as  much  as  just  a  matter  of 
administrative  mismanagement.  The  specific  organization  governmental 
authorities ask to implement the policy does not take ownership and deliver.  
 
Do  in  fact  public  organizations  correct  their  errors?  The  addition  of  both 
production functions makes public organizations a very complicated context to 
manage. Inner dysfunctions may generate outer dysfunctions. 
 
Rules and formal structures are solutions aimed at solving problems defined in 
advance, the different units inside the agency being expected to conform.  At the 
same time the organization is supposed to produce and handle information about 
its environment and the impacts of its knowledge structure. Information means 
surprise, anomaly, a signal that something goes wrong about action taking and 
the knowledge structure itself.  Evidence suggests that publicness hinders the 
use of errors as incentives to correct knowledge structure. 
 
Like many private and not for profit organizations, public agencies usually show 
a high level of knowledge. The problem derives from the fact that the more an 
organization has knowledge the less it has information, the less it generates and 
handles errors as a lack of adequate knowledge and a piece of information. An 
error becomes a sin to avoid, a pathological state to hide, not an opportunity to 
learn, a signal to make sense of for future action taking. When error happens 
people are often punished while errors are not spontaneously corrected.  
 
Unlike  other  classes  of  organizations,  and  because  of  their  effectiveness 
production function, public agencies face another obstacle in correcting errors 
and using information. As mentioned above, and in a majority of cases, external 
impacts indicators are fuzzy and ideologically loaded, objectives are uncertain, 
time horizons are controversial and unstable, causal linkages between a specific 
policy and a specific set of outcomes are not linear and difficult to establish. 
Even rudimentary self-awareness is lacking. 
 
Policy evaluation is neither spontaneously induced nor obvious to achieve. The 
idea  to  manage  an  evaluation  of  effectiveness  is  an  ideal  goal  difficult  to 
achieve, an utopia (Thoenig 2002). Evaluation and organization are somewhat     17 
contradictory.  Public  agencies  as  organizations  do  not,  most  of  the  time, 
evaluate their own activities (Wildavsky 1979). They do not correct errors and 
surprises that are generated either by the action theory that its organizational 
structure implies or by the societal theory implicit in the policy it is mandated to 
implement. They rely instead on their knowledge to identify societal needs to 
serve  and  effective  means  to  deliver  them.  Efficiency  and  effectiveness  are 
relevant as long as their criteria and achievements are in line with the knowledge 
structure. If not they make not much sense. The public organization prefers to 




3. From organization to organizing and organized 
 
Theoretical  and  conceptual  frameworks  are  not  by  themselves  ends.  They 
provide  means.  They  are  useful  as  tools  to  explain  certain  problems,  and 
obstacles to understand others. Publicness as defined above offers a heuristically 
fruitful way to explore the characteristics of public action and the way public 
organizations contribute to it.  
 
Studies of public organizations gain a lot from maintaining close contact with 
policy  analysis.  They  improve  Verstehen  approaches  of  what  governmental 
authorities do and the public issues that are addressed. Bringing policymaking 
and polities back in enables academic research to deal with content, and not to 
focus  only  on  process.  It  also  widens  the  picture.  Daily  routines,  formal 
structures  and  inner  functioning  of  agencies  are  also  parts  of  a  more  global 
action arena called policy-making.  
 
In the late 1970s  and  early  1980s several public  administration scholars left 
organizational sociology stricto sensu and joined political sociology or science, 
but  without  dropping  their  research  interest  for  governmental  agencies  and 
publicness as such, on the contrary. Pioneering studies in Europe (Mayntz 1979; 
Dupuy and Thoenig1979)  as well as in the USA (Pressman and Wildavsky 
1973;  Bendor1985;  Chisholm1989).  Fruitful  convergencies  between  policy 
studies  and  organizational  reasoning  derived  from  the  study  of  constitutive 
polices  such  as  intergovernmental  studies  and  decentralization  of  territorial 
affairs (Rhodes 1982; Thoenig 2005). Studying policies is a stimulating way to 
explore organizations with different lenses or from a different angle.  
 
One  major  contribution  to  publicness  study  made  possible  by  an  action 
perspective is empirical.  
     18 
In most policy sectors problems are addressed and handled by more than one 
formal agency. In other terms what happens in one sector is the consequence of 
what many policies and public bureaucracies do, whether intentionally or not. 
Unemployment is the consequence of multiple governmental acts and non-acts, 
from locating low income housing to fiscal incentives and training programs.  
Several policy sectors and agencies combine to influence its rate and structure. 
More generally a specific policy induces consequences and impacts not only for 
the specific problem it is designed for, but also for other problems and the way 
other policies operate and impact society. Therefore cases are quite exceptional 
when  a  specific  formal  organization  exerts  a  full  monopoly  and  exclusive 
ownership on a policy jurisdiction. 
 
Observation  suggests  on  and  on  that  public  agencies  are  not  working  in  a 
autarkic manner. Their acts and non-acts are not the only ones that matter to 
solve a specific issue carried by the governmental agenda. Many organizations 
with another legal status – voluntary organizations, private firms, charities, etc – 
intervene, formally or informally, as subcontractors, as policy implementers, as 
problem solvers, etc. Political science defines such sets by metaphors and terms 
such  as  policy  arenas  or  communities.  Local  economic  development,  social 
welfare, health, crime and law, public transportation, are just a few policy areas 
among many that see coalitions at work. The lesson is that public issues and 
their treatment should not be considered in a statocentric manner. Public policies 
are collective problems, involving many institutions and organizations. Public 
agencies and the state are just one among many actors, sometimes much more 
powerful and relevant than others, sometimes much less. 
 
These observations imply lasting consequences for organizations studies. A state 
of the art survey of literature identifies main categories of public organizations 
(Thoenig 1997). The criterion used is the degree to which inner functioning is 
impermeable  or  sensitive  to  outer  dynamics  and  factors.  Four  types  may  be 
listed:  
  an  inward-orientated  type  of  functioning.  It  cuts  itself  from  its 
environment. 
  an environment sensitive type. It takes into account outside stakes, groups 
and issues by showing local flexibility capacities or by institutionalizing 
cooptation processes, whether formally or informally. 
  an outward-driven type of functioning. Public organizations are highly 
dependant  from  outside  forces  such  as  professions  or  from  outside 
relevant resources such as information. Centrifugal dynamics matter more 
than their authority hierarchy. 
  an  inter-organizational  system  embedded  type  of  organizational 
functioning. The formal organization does not provide the backbone of its     19 
integration. It is regulated by some broader and rather stable network or 
collective action system of which it is part.  
 
Formal organizations are not the only way to fulfill certain outcomes. Other 
social configurations and processes such as organizing and organized do offer 
alternative solutions. Making different logics of action compatible in a lasting 
way  and  without  major  difficulties  can  be  achieved  otherwise  than  by  a 
hierarchy of authority principle. Policy adjustments and cooperation between 
separate when not rhetorically antagonistic public agencies and private operators 
may  even  be  easier  to  induce  without  using  formal  coordination  structures 
across them. Mixing policy analysis and organization analysis leads to identify 
and analyze other forms of social voluntary cooperation: informal cooptation, 
cross-regulation,  redundancy,  collective  action,  networks,  etc.  Public 
organization scholars were to some extent ahead of private firms.  It is later in 
the 1980s that the latter gave birth to attention given to similar mechanisms 
linking operators acting on economic markets such as joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, etc.  
 
Such a research program started in the late 1970s. Two key social processes, 
widely ignored or under-estimated, were brought to light by social sciences:  
organizing, the organized.  
 
Organizing  refers  to  the  way  separate  actors  linked  by  some  form  of 
interdependencies  build  a  pattern  allowing  recurrent  behavior  and  action 
certainty. Which normative schemes and behavioral processes are set up and 
diffused? How and why are action taking and division of work quasi-negotiated? 
(Dupuy and Thoenig 1979). 
 
Organized  refers  to  the  way  quasi-organized  social  configurations  grow  and 
evolve that are not coordinated by one center, but by a multi-centric core.  How 
do shared social norms – rules on rules, or secondary rules (Reynaud 1989) – 
emerge and get constructed that shape appropriate ways to behave and to design 
operating rules – or primary rules - emerge? What integrative mechanisms are at 
work  such  as  indoctrination,  domination,  regulation  or  self-interest  based 
opportunism? How is social integration achieved when no clear-cut limits define 
the boundaries, the limits memberships, when relationships between the various 
parts are not transitive and when asymmetry between levels is very low? What 
are the performance abilities of such and such types of organized set up? 
 
These issues had been ignored by organization studies for many years. Basically 
focused on organizations as formal forms of human activity cooperation, they 
took for granted that to explain social phenomena inside a public agency, it was 
sufficient to observe what was happening inside its legal or formal limits, in     20 
some cases by adding the users as a source of observation. A few pioneering 
studies had suggested that ignoring the wider action set may be a constraint for 
the advancement of knowledge in organization studies. They identified social 
constructs such as grass roots cooptation of local elites and institutionalization 
(Selznick  1949)  or  exchange  of  favors  between  field  agencies  and  local 
politicians (Crozier and Thoenig 1976). Support and conflict with civil society 
lobbies and social milieus were analyzed as organizational vectors for public 
sector agencies. Policemen, social workers, tax collectors, just to mention a few, 
have a public service mission enforce detailed rules and codified procedures. 
Their success or their failure depends nevertheless to a degree that may not be 
irrelevant  from  access  to  and  support  from  local  resources  provided  by 
outsiders:  to get intelligence, to identify users, to get help from relays and allies, 
etc. Despite such exciting findings public organization studies surprisingly did 
not really switch to other research designs until policies and quasi organized 
action systems would open up a different approach.   
              
A corollary of such a breakthrough is methodological. If it is true that formally 
autonomous  organizations  may  depend  from  others  when  handling  a  certain 
problem  or  implementing  a  certain  policy,  then  it  implies  that  it  is  such  a 
specific  problem  or  policy  that  structures  a  form  of  organized  structure  and 
organizing activity between a set of actors, that generates this set and provides 
interdependence for cooperation. In other words the content and the context of a 
problem or a policy design inter-organizational types of social configurations.  
Usually rather implicit, they nevertheless may be quite well established, durable, 
etc. One public agency therefore may be part of many such inter-organizational 
settings.  Action  and  order  requirements  are  quite  complex  to  address  in  a 
organized manner, at least more than classic organization sociology inspired by 
Max Weber‟s formal model had thought of. Bureaucratization tells only one part 
of the story in public sector and public action.  
 
Further research is still needed to explore in a more systematic way a wide 
variety of questions. Three may be worth mentioning. 
 
Are specific kinds of organizational configurations coupled with specific policy 
tools  such  as  monies,  rules  or  institution  building?  Various  typologies  are 
available  that  classify  policies  according  to  criteria  such  as  the  degree  of 
coercion they exert on the groups and individuals whose practices and statuses 
they want to modify (Salisbury 1968) or the toolkit governmental authorities 
select for policy-making (Hood 1983). More systematic and comparative studies 
would  be  welcome  that  would  verify  whether  such  a  co-variation  do  occur. 
Pioneering research projects undertaken, for instance, by Renate Mayntz and her 
associates on implementation processes in Germany have paved the way (Marin 
and Mayntz 1991). Much more evidence would be welcomed.     21 
 
Another challenge for knowledge questions the dissociation between power and 
authority and its consequences. Is it true that horizontal negotiation dynamics 
facilitate efficiency and effectiveness much more than hierarchical authority? 
Do control and command processes really face dramatic difficulties to impose 
their schemes to peripheries that are far from being passive, as it seems to be the 
case for instance for issues and sectors like territorial decentralization (Thoenig 
2005)  or  urban  government  (Le  Galès  1998)?  If  this  is  so,  what  are  the 
implications for organizational values such as the pursuit of general interest and 
for the content of professional skills inside public agencies? Are administrative 
bureaucratization and narrow action codification mere pathological obstacles or 
are they necessary counterparts to make participative democracy work?  
 
A last but not least new frontier relates to cognitions, their nature, their function. 
For  many  years  organizational  sociologists  studying  public  agencies  have 
ignored such a facet. Policy evaluation research has given more attention to it. 
Stakeholders such as political decision makers and citizens express normative 
judgments  and  mobilize  prejudices  when  considering  that  a  policy  fails  or 
succeeds.  State  agencies  protect  themselves  from  centrifugal  forces  and 
particularistic requests emanating from society and polity by building barriers 
such  as  professional  norms  or  moral  identity  references  such  as  the  general 
interest.  The nature of such phenomena is clearly cognitive. Exploring them 
implies the observation of criteria in act or at work, and not just a collection of 
discourses or a set of so-called cognitive maps. Shared cognitions or common 
languages for action are neither argumentation nor rhetorical artifacts. They also 
cannot  be  reduced  just  to  local  expressions  of  some  exogenous  and  global 
phenomena  such  as  class  ideologies  or  professional  cultures.  They  induce 
empirical consequences. And they are generated by organized settings. Some 
progress has been made in the last years about cognitions in firms (Michaud and 
Thoenig 2003). Is it fair to say that public organization studies have still some 
way to go in this respect? 
 
Time has come to reconsider the public sector and its organizations as a problem 
to be studied empirically, with depth and rigor, with creativity and in an agnostic 
way. Scholars have learned that, to a large extent, notions like the state and the 
public administration are analytically poor or disappointing. They cover highly 
differentiated  realities. Their  boundaries keep  fluctuating. Identical  criticisms 
could apply to civil society as a notion. Public organization researchers also 
realize that New Public Management was a parenthesis, that provided bread and 
butter for many of them, in terms of publications and public subsidies, that was 
polemical  –which  may  be  a  positive  thing  -  but  did  not  generate  many 
conceptual breakthroughs based on rich empirical evidence – not to discover 
new phenomena is not ideal.      22 
 
The relevance of publicness should be tested, less for its own sake than as an 
analytic tool. Its added value is worth considering as long as it contributes to the 
advancement of general organization, organizing and organized theory, but also 
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